Abstract: Anonymous authentication is very useful to protect the user's privacy, and plays an important role in building e-commence where involves many partners, such as in cloud computing. With the anonymous property, ring signature provides a cryptographic tool to construct a secure authentication scheme. In this paper, we construct an identity-based ring signature (IBRS) based on Garg-Gentry-Halevi (GGH) graded encoding system which is a candidate multilinear maps from ideal lattice, and prove its security in random oracle model. Under the GGH graded decisional Diffie-Hellman (GDDH) assumption, the proposed ring signature guarantees the anonymity of signer against full keys exposure attacks. Considering unforgeability, under the GGH graded computational Diffie-Hellman (GCDH) assumption, the new scheme provides unforgeability both against selectively chosen subring attacks and insider corruption.
Introduction
Cloud computing, the long-held dream of computing as a utility, is increasingly becoming popular as many enterprise applications and data are moving into cloud platforms (Armbrust et al., 2010) . Currently, more and more companies concentrate main efforts to develop cloud computing system, and continue to improve their services for the larger amount of users. However, the security issue is a major barrier for users to adapt into cloud platform, even though cloud computing system is able to provide infinite computing resource on demand due to its high scalability (Minqi et al., 2010; Sengupta et al., 2011) .
In cloud security, privacy is a critical challenge, including the need to protect identity information, policy components during integration, and transaction histories (Takabi et al., 2010; Li et al., 2010; Kiyomoto et al., 2013) . Ring signature provides an important cryptographic tool to solving these problems. In a ring signature, any member in the ring can sign on behalf of the whole ring. As a result, the verifier is convinced that this signature is from a ring in which the signer is a member, but it is hard to know which member in the ring actually generates the signature. On the definition of security for ring signature, Bendery et al. (2006) gave a strongest definition of both anonymity and unforgeability depending on the security strength for ring signature. Due to the unique anonymity and flexibility (such as, no managers and no revocation procedure), ring signature plays an important role in cloud computing for solving privacy issue, which have been suggested in some works (Jensen et al., 2010; Xin et al., 2011; Joshi and Petrlic, 2013) . In order to demonstrate how to use ring signature for the anonymous authentication in cloud, we consider a privacy-preserving digital right management (PP-DRM) system (Joshi and Petrlic, 2013) . Its architecture includes software providers (SWP), users (U), a trusted third party (TTP) and cloud computing servers (CC), which is shown in Figure 1 . In the model, the users and SWP should register with the TTP during the initialisation. Users can purchase software licenses from SWP in the way of anonymous payment. After license is verified by TTP, they can execute the corresponding software through CC servers that has already obtained the copies of software from SP. Although TTP does not know the license information about a specific software ID because of the proxy reencryption and anonymous receiver encryption technology used in DRM, it can find out that which swp ∈ SWP provides u ∈ U with a software during the authentication procedure, since the TTP owners the information of SWP and users. To prevent TTP from profile building (e.g., certain swp provides only very specialised software), ring signature on the license of SWP can be constructed. Thus, TTP will be able to verify whether the license has been signed by a certified swp but it will not know by which swp. This type of DRM can achieve privacy protection asked for by users in the honest-but-curious model through combing ring signature with an anonymous recipient scheme. Since the identity-based cryptography supports non-interactively key negotiation without requiring a public-key infrastructure for verification key (Boneh and Franklin, 2001 ), the identity-based ring signature (IBRS) scheme was proposed (Zhang and Kim, 2002) . In an identity-based ring signature scheme, the public keys of users can be derived from their identity strings (for example, from e-mail or IP address) while the corresponding private key can be computed by the key generator centre (KGC) which is a trusted authority. This property avoids the necessity of certificates and is desirable especially for the efficiency of ring signature.
Most of the existing identity-based ring signature schemes are based on number theory assumptions: the bilinear pairing problems (Zhang and Kim, 2002; Herranz and Saez, 2004; Chow et al., 2005; Li and Wang, 2006) and large integer factorisation (Herranz, 2007) . However, with the advent of quantum computer era, the classical problems (e.g., large integer factorisation, discrete logarithm problem) in number theory can be efficiently solved by quantum algorithms. Thus, all the above schemes will no longer be secure.
To design an efficient and post-quantum secure IBRS scheme is a meaningful topic. In this paper, we construct a new identity-based ring signature based on GGH's graded encoding system which is a candidate multilinear maps from ideal lattice (Gargl et al., 2013) . In the GGH mechanism, the graded decisional Diffie-Hellman (GDDH) assumption and grade computational Diffie-Hellman (GCDH) assumption are defined. Now, although the GDDH/GCDH problems can not be directly reduced to the standard lattice problems (such as SIS or LWE), an extensive cryptanalysis has been done, and it shows that the assumptions in GGH framework hold against sub-exponential advantage.
Our main contribution, from a theoretical point of view, is that the proposed IBRS scheme is the first one to be based on multilinear maps, and no identity-based ring signature has till now been based on it. Under the GDDH/GCDH assumptions, the new ring signature scheme guarantees the anonymity of signer even if the secret key of the signer is exposed and holds the existential unforgeability against selectively chosen subring attack in random oracle model, respectively.
Finally, we would like to note that our IBRS scheme seems to have higher efficiency because both the signing and verification only involve the polynomial modular addition and multiplication in polynomial ring. However, compared with the best results of the number theoretic scheme, the proposed signature scheme is still unpractical because the size of public keys is too large, which is similar to the IBRS schemes based on lattice. Therefore, we are here only concerned with the theoretical contributions.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we introduce some preliminaries, including multilinear maps, the algorithms in the GGH framework, full domain hash (FDH) from multilinear maps, the definition of identity-based ring signature and its security model. In Section 3, the new IBRS scheme based on multilinear maps is described in details, and in Section 4, we proves its security including the anonymity and unforgeability. Finally, we summarise this paper in Section 5.
Preliminaries

Notations
We use Z to denote the set of integer, and R = Z[X]/(X n ) to denote the integer polynomial ring where n is a power of 2. For a large prime q ∈ Z, R q = Z q [X]/(X n + 1) = R/qR denotes the quotient ring of integer polynomial mod q. Let I denote an ideal of ring R, then R/I denotes a quotient ring generated by the ideal I, and {e + I : e ∈ R} denotes the representative of coset of the quotient ring R/I. By convention, we use italic bold letters for vector (e.g., A or a). For a positive integer k, [k] denotes {1, • • •, k}. In addition, the function negl(λ) is negligible in λ if it is smaller than all polynomial fractions for large λ.
Multilinear maps and the GGH graded encoding system
Boneh and Silverberg (BS) (2003) first proposed the concept of multilinear maps and described serval cryptographic applications. For the groups G 1 and G 2 which have the same prime order, the definition of BS is that if a map
is an n-multilinear maps, for a 1 , ……, a n ∈ Z, it should satisfy the following properties:
The map ε is non-degenerate. In other words, if g ∈ G 1 is a generator of G 1 , then
Although several efficient cryptographic primitives were constructed based on the concept of multilinear maps, Boneh and Silverberg also pointed out that instantiating this kind of multilinear maps on Weil or Tate pair was infeasible. In the past decade, how to achieve cryptographically useful multilinear maps has been an important open problem. Recently, Garg, Gentry and Halevi (GGH) construct an approximate multilinear map from ideal lattice, which is also known as GGH graded coding system. In a k-level GGH candidate, as long as i + j ≤ k, we can multiply the encodings on level-i by encodings on level-j to get the encodings on level-(i + j). Of course, the product should be smaller than the modulus q. By multiplication in an iterative manner, the encodings on level-k can be obtained. This approach is different from the BS view of multilinear maps where a k-linear maps should allow the simultaneous multiplication of k source group elements into one target group element. Here, we briefly describe the GGH framework as follows, and the details can be referred to Gargl et al. (2013) . Abstractly, in GGH graded encoding system, the exponentiation i g α in multilinear group family is viewed as an encoding of an element α on the level-i. At the same time, the GGH replaces the groups defined in BS with an encoding set associated with ideal lattice. Specifically, for a ring R, the GGH graded encoding system includes a system of sets ) takes as input the security parameter λ and an integer k that denotes the level number. The algorithm outputs (params, p zt ) where params is a description of a k-level GGH encoding system, and p zt is a level-k 'zero-test parameter'.
• Ring sampler. The randomised algorithm Samp(params) outputs an level-zero encoding a ∈ R, such that the distribution of a is statically uniform.
• Encoding. The randomised algorithm enc(params, i, d) takes the level number i ∈ [n] and a level-zero encoding ( ) 
and outputs a level-i encoding
for the same a.
• Re-randomisation. This algorithm re-Rand(params, i, u) re-randomises the encoding
to the same level and obtains another encoding
Moreover, for any two encodings
whose noise bound is at most b, the output distributions of re-Rand(params, i, u) and re-Rand(params, i, u * ) are statistically the same.
• Addition and negation. Given any two level-i encodings • Zero-testing. Given the zero-testing parameter p zt and a level-k encoding u, the algorithm isZero(params, p zt , u) outputs 1 if (0) .
Otherwise, it outputs 0. Note that the encoding is additively homomorphic, so we can test quality between encodings by subtracting them and comparing to zero.
• Extraction. The algorithm ext(params, p zt , u) can extract a canonical and random representative of coset from the encoding. Namely, the procedure outputs K ∈ {0, 1} λ , such that:
a for any two level-k encodings
ext(params, p zt , u 1 ) = ext(params, p zt , u 2 ) with overwhelming probability b for a ∈ R and any encoding ( ) ,
the distribution of ext(params, p zt , u) is statistically uniform over {0, 1} * .
• For ease of description, we also omit params arguments that are provided to every algorithm in GGH framework as above. For instance, instead of samp(params), we will write samp(). In addition, let reenc(params, i, u) denotes the function of reRand(params, i, enc(params, i, u)) where u is a result of a call to samp(params).
GCDH/GDDH hard assumptions
Now, we describe the hard assumptions in GGH framework: graded computational Diffie-Hellman problem (GCDH) and graded decisional Diffie-Hellman problem (GDDH), which are the basis of the security of our IBRS scheme in this paper.
Definition 2.1: (GCDH/GDDH). On parameters λ, n, q, k, a challenger runs
to get the public parameters (params, p zt ) of the GGH graded encoding system, and it calls several times samp() to pick the random elements e 0 , • • •, e k . Then, • Given params, p zt , reenc(1, e 0 ), • • •, reenc(1, e k ), the goal of the GCDH is to find a level-k encoding of [0, ] .
• Given params, p zt , reenc(1, e 0 ), • • •, reenc(1, e k ) and a random level-k encoding u ←reenc(k, samp()), the goal of the k-GDDH is to distinguish between the level-k encoding [0, ] re-enc( , )
) and the random encoding u.
In Gargl et al. (2013) , an extensive cryptanalysis has been done to prove the security of GGH graded encoding system, and it shows that the GCDH/GDDH problems are hard for any polynomial-time algorithm to solve. Recently, serval effective cryptography primitives based on GCDH/GDDH are proposed, such as multiparty key agreement (Gargl et al., 2013) , FDH from multilinear maps and identity-based aggregate signatures (Hohenberger et al., 2013) , attribute-based encryption for circuits (Gorbunov et al., 2013) and so on.
FDH from multilinear maps
FDH is an important cryptographic technique and has been widely used in bilinear map cryptography where typically a hash function is employed to hash a string into a bilinear group. In this section, we briefly describe a method to achieve the FDH from multilinear maps, which will be used in our ring signature scheme. The construction in terms of GGH framework and message signature based on it are described as follows, and the details can be referred to Hohenberger et al. (2013) .
Hash and sign from GGH framework. A trusted algorithm generates a GGH instance by running (params,
) where λ is the security parameter and l is the length of message. It obtains 2l elements A i,j ←reenc(1, samp() m[i] . So, the FDH based on GGH framework can be defined as
Therefore, given a private key a ← samp() and the corresponding verification key VK = reenc (1, a) , a signature on message m is σ = reenc(k − 1,H(m) • a), which can be verified by testing isZero(p zt , σ • y − H(m) •VK) where y is a level-1 encoding of 1 that is included in params of the GGH instance. Hohenberger et al. (2013) showed that this signature was secure against adaptively chosen message attack in standard model conditioned on the k-GCDH assumption holding against sub-exponential advantage.
Definition of identity-based ring signature
An identity-based ring signature scheme is a tuple of polynomial-time algorithms IBRS(Setup, Extract, Sign, Verf).
• Setup(1 λ ). It is probabilistic algorithm, which takes as input the security parameter λ and outputs a list of public common parameters PP which are used in all algorithms and the master private key (MSK) for the KGC.
• Extract (PP, MSK, ID) . It is a probabilistic algorithm which takes as input the public parameters PP, the master private key of KGC, a user's ID i ∈ {0, 1} * , (1 ≤ i ≤ max) and outputs the user's private key . • Verf (PP, σ, m, R) . It is a deterministic algorithm, which takes as the public parameters PP, a ring signature σ on message m as well as the corresponding ring R. It outputs 1 if σ is a valid ring, otherwise it outputs 0 for reject. For correctness, it is required that for any {PP, 
Secure model
For a secure IBRS scheme Φ with max members, it must satisfy the anonymity and unforgeability. According to the security strength, Bendery et al. (2006) defined various levels of anonymity and unforgeability for ring signature, respectively. In this paper, the anonymity uses the strongest definition, which is against full key exposure, while the existential unforgeability is defined under the selectively chosen subring attack.
Anonymity. The anonymity Anon(Φ, A, λ, max) under full key exposure is defined by using the following experiment between a challenger and an adversary A, in which A can make ring signing queries and corruption queries.
• Given the security parameter λ, the challenger runs the setup algorithm to generate the common public parameters PP and the master private key MSK. Then, the challenger sends PP to A.
• A can adaptively issues ring signing queries, the form of which is ( , , ) i m R for index Unforgeability. For the IBRS scheme Φ, the existential unforgeability Unforg(Φ, F, λ, max) with respect to adaptively chosen subring attack and chosen-message attack (we call Ufa-CMA-CR secure) can be defined by using the following experiment between a challenger and a forger F.
• Setup. Given the security parameter λ, the challenger runs the setup algorithm to generate the common public parameters PP and the master private key MSK. Then, the challenger sends PP to A, and keeps MSK secure.
• Query. F chooses a subring R ⊂ T and requests a ring signature (i, m, R) where as the probability that the forger F wins in above game, where the probability is over the coin tosses of the Setup, Sign algorithms and of F. In this paper, we will use the selective variant (Ufa-CMA-CR secure) to Unforg (Φ, F, λ, max as the probability that the forger F wins the game, taken over the random bits of the challenger and the forger. According to the definition of ring signature, our new IBRS scheme in GGH framework is as follows.
The algorithm is run by the KGC of IBRS system. It takes as input the security parameter λ and the size of ring set L ≤max, then • Run (params, p zt )←inst(1 λ , 1
L+l+1
) to generate a GGH instance where l is the bitlength of messages. Let k = L + l + 1.
• Choose random encodings a i,v ←samp() for i ∈ [l] and v ∈ {0, 1}, and generate the corresponding level-1 encodings A i,v ←reenc(1, a i,v ) . Let
• Let h be a hash function that maps {0, 1} N to a level-1 encodings. It can be viewed as a random oracle. Let H be a FDH function described in Section 2.
• Pick a random encoding a 0 ←samp() and generate the corresponding level-1 encoding A 0 ←reenc(1, a 0 ).
• Output the public parameters 
Extract(PP, MSK, ID i
). This algorithm generates the private key sk i ←reenc(1,MSK ⋅ h(ID i )) for the users.
Sign(PP, m, sk i , R).
Given the public parameter PP, a ring R of identities (in order to simplify the symbols, assume that R = {ID 1 , • • •, ID L }), a user's secret key sk i and a message m, the user does as follows.
• Let m[1], • • •, m[l] be the bits of message m. A level-l encoding
H(m) = reenc(l, H l (m)) can be computed by using the FDH function.
• Compute ( )
• Output a ring signature s = reenc(k − 1, s 1 ).
Verf(PP, s, m, R).
The algorithm takes as input the common public parameters PP, a signature s, a message m and the ring R. The authentication process is as follows.
• Compute the level-l encoding H(m) = reenc(l, H l (m)) about message m by using the FDH function.
• Check the signature by calling the zero testing algorithm is
p s y where y is a canonical level-1 encoding of 1 that is included in params, part of the public parameter PP. The signature is accepted if and only if the zero testing algorithm outputs 1.
The correctness property requires that each valid ring signature can pass the verification algorithm. In the above ring signature scheme, s • y is a level-k encoding of
Therefore, it can be concluded that all valid ring signatures will be pass the testing algorithm, as long as the underlying algorithms run correctly in GGH graded encoding system, e.g. samp(), enc(), re-Rand().
Security analysis
In this section, according to the security model that is defined in Section 2, we analyse the anonymity and unforgeability of the proposed identity-based ring signature scheme.
Theorem 1: If the GDDH assumption holds, then the proposed ring signature scheme based on GGH graded encoding system satisfies the unconditional anonymity.
Proof: According to the anonymity game in Section 2, the Proof of Theorem 1 is as follows.
• According to the corresponding parameters in the proposed signature scheme, the challenger runs (params,
) to generate a GGH instance, and chooses random encodings a i,v ←samp() for i ∈ [l] and v ∈ {0, 1}. Let A i,v ←reenc(1, a i,v ). Then, it chooses a random encoding a 0 ←samp() and generates the corresponding level-1 encoding A 0 ←reenc(1, a 0 ). Let a 0 be the master key, and the challenger sends {params, p zt , A 0 , (A 1,0 , A 1,1 ), • • •, (A l,0 , A l,1 )} to the adversary A.
• A adaptively issues ring signing queries for messages m ∈ {0, 1} * with respect to the
After receiving them, the challenger calls the algorithm Sign in the proposed scheme and returns the results to A.
• A continues to adaptively query the signing secret key of the user ID i , where
. The challenger replies the corresponding secret key · ( ). • Finally, A wants to determine the identity of signer and outputs a guess b * for b. Now, let us analyse the advantage of A. In order to facilitate the discussion and without loss of generality, we can assume
According to the algorithm Sign in the proposed signature scheme, we know that each valid ring signature in the above game is a random encoding on the level-(k − 1). Therefore, we only need to analyse the distribution of the ring signature. On the one hand, regardless of the ring signature s * from the user ID 0 or the user ID 1 , the valid signature s * on message m about the ring R is a random level
That is, for the same message, the distribution of the ring signature from the different members in the same ring R is indistinguishable. On the other hand, according to the definition of GDDH assumption, we know that the adversary can not distinguish between the encoding
s a that is the ring signature computed by challenger and an random encoding can be ignored, and the proposed ring signature scheme is unconditional anonymity.
Theorem 2: The proposed ring signature scheme for message length l and the number of members L of a ring is UFs-CMA-CR secure in the unforgeability game under k-GCDH assumption where k = l + L + 1.
Proof: Let F be a PPT forger that attacks the proposed IBRS scheme when h is modelled as a random oracle. Let Q h be the number of queries made by F. If F can break the selective security of the proposed identity-based ring signature scheme with advantage ε ≥ 0 for message length l and the number of members L of a ring, then we can construct an efficient algorithm that can break the (l + L + 1)-GCDH assumption with probability
The experiment between the challenger and the forger F is as follows. .
where Q h is the maximum number of queries to h that F can make.
• Maintain a list T which is initialised to be empty and store the sequences of index-identity-hash value-private key triple.
• Publish the public parameters: Query: The challenger will be able to answer the signing queries according to the Ufs-CMA-CR secure model defined in Section 3. It can be assumed that F has made hash queries for each identity before the corruption queries and signing queries.
• Random-oracle hash queries (ID i ∈ {0, 1} N ). F may query the random oracle h adaptively. The challenger answers such query as follows (we assume that the
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queries are unique, otherwise the challenger simply returns the same output on the same input without incrementing the query counter Q h ). It is easy to see that the forger F can proceed without aborting with the probability Pr [ abort] 1/ ( ) ( ). ε LQ negl n − in solving the GCDH assumption.
Conclusions
As cloud computing becomes prevalent, more and more sensitive information are being centralised into the cloud. Cloud service providers must assure their customers and provide a high degree of transparency into their operations and privacy assurance. Ring signature plays an important role in cloud computing for solving privacy issues, which has been widely used to complete anonymous authentication to protect identity information, policy components during integration, and transaction histories. In this paper, we construct a novel IBRS scheme and prove its security in random-oracle model. The new ring signature scheme guarantees the anonymity of signer even if the secret key of the signer is exposed and holds the existential unforgeability against selectively chosen subring attack, respectively.
